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'Dicta Observes
During the past summer a committee of law students of
the University of Denver School of Law, together with two
members of the faculty, discussed the proposition of writing
and publishing articles on different legal subjects. They took
the matter up with Dean Roger H. Wolcott for the purpose
of securing an outlet for the articles and Dean Wolcott and
Mr. Gordon Johnston, of the faculty, and a committee of the
law students composed of H. S. Silverstein, Jr., Chairman,
Stanley L. Drexler, secretary, Richard P. Brown, Charles W.
Delaney, Jr., Samuel S. Sherman, Jr., Marvin A. Schwartz
and George S. Graham, met with the Editorial Staff of Dicta
at an informal luncheon at the Denver Athletic Club. After
discussion with the Editorial Staff the students were invited
to submit their contributions and Dicta is pleased to present
four articles entitled:
1. Suicide, Sane or Insane, an Accident; by Harry S.
Silverstein, Jr., Class of 1936.
2. Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons; When
the Right of the Beneficiary Becomes Indefeasible; by George
S. Graham, Class of 1936.
3. For Colorado: A Criminal Code; by Stanley L.
Drexler, Class of 1936.
4. The Survival of Actions in Colorado; by Richard
P. Brown, Class of 1935.

SUICIDE, SANE OR INSANE, AN ACCIDENT?
NSURANCE companies of their own volition have never
undertaken to insure the risk of suicide. At first it was
held by the courts of this country that if an insured committed suicide his beneficiary could not recover, whether the
policy mentioned suicide or not. The courts declared that
suicide while sane was a fraud on the company. Ritter vs.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U. S. 139, 42 L. Ed. 693. Later
the courts began to change their views where the beneficiary
had a vested interest on the ground that this interest could not
be defeated by the act of a third party. To overcome this
view or rule of law the insurance companies began to expressly except this risk from their policies and have continued
to do so to the present day.
Beneficiaries contended that this clause was inoperative
and invalid, but it was early held, in Bigelow vs. Berkshire
Ins. Co., 93 U. S. 284, 23 L. Ed. 918, that such a clause was
valid and enforceable. For, said the court, in an opinion by
Davis., J.: "If they (insurance companies) are at liberty to
stipulate against hazardous occupations or unhealthy climates
* * . surely it is competent for them to stipulate against an
intentional act of self-destruction, whether it be the voluntary act of a moral agent or not." The policy in this case
excepted the risk of suicide while sane or insane.
Such has continued to be the law in most states down to
the present time. However, a few states-Missouri, Utah
and Colorado in particular-believing such a clause to be contrary to public policy, have passed statutes calculated to nullify its effect.
The statutes in the three states are the same in effect, the
old Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals declaring in Continental
Casualty Co. vs. Agee, 3 F. (2) 978, 983, that the interpretation given by the Supreme Court of the United States to the
Missouri statute, "looking at the object of the statute and
giving effect to the words according to their ordinary, natural meaning," was binding on the Circuit Court of Appeals
in interpreting the Utah statute. This Utah statute is identical with the Colorado statute. The Supreme Court case referred to was Whitfield vs. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 205 U. S.
489, 51 L. Ed. 895.
The Missouri statute is as follows:
32
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"In all suits upon policies of insurance on life issued by any company doing business in this state, to a citizen of this state, it shall be no
defense that the insured committed suicide, unless it be shown to the
satisfaction of the court or jury trying the cause, that the insured contemplated suicide at the time he made his application for the policy, and
any stipulation in the policy to the contrary shall be void." R. S.
1919, #6150.

The Colorado statute reads:
"From and after the passage of this act, the suicide of a policyholder after the first policy year of any Life Insurance Company doing
business in this state shall not be a defense against the payment of a life
insurance policy, whether said suicide was voluntary or involuntary, and
whether said policyholder was sane or insane." Colorado Compiled
Laws of 1921, j2532.

Utah's statute is identical with the Colorado statute except that in the Utah statute the word "chapter" is substituted
for the word "act" in the first phrase of the law. Compiled
Laws of Utah of 1917, # 1171.
The insurance companies naturally contended that such
statutes were unconstitutional, but the courts have uniformly
held contra. The Colorado Supreme Court in Woodmen of
the World vs. Sloss, 49 Colo. 177, referring to the Colorado
statute, said its "enactment was a legitimate exercise of power
by the state legislature" and that it was not contrary to the
provisions of either the state or federal constitutions. "By
this statute," stated the court, "the state has declared it to be
against public policy to permit insurance companies to contract against the payment of their policies, in the event of loss,
because the insured came to his death by suicide." This view
has been upheld by the Colorado Supreme Court in its later
decisions and by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, most
recently in Aetna Life Ins. Co. vs. Braukman, 70 F. (2) 647.
Having settled the constitutionality of these statutes, it
became necessary to interpret them, not only as to the type
of companies and policies controlled, but also as to the situations which they governed. Clearly life policies issued by life
insurance companies fell within the scope of the statutes, but
it was contended that the acts were not so limited in their
effect. Beneficiaries claimed that accident insurance policies
werecontrolled when such policies contained a provision for
payment in case of an accidental death or death by accidental
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means. The courts upheld this contention from the first, the
latest Colorado decision to that effect being Mass. Protective
Association vs. Daugherty, 87 Colo. 469.
Missouri, Utah and Colorado all have agreed that the
statutes apply to an accident insurance policy where the insured commits suicide while insane, but there is a decided split
of authority as to the applicability of these enactments in
cases of suicide while the insured is sane.
This particular point has never come before the courts
in Colorado. In this connection the case of Business Men's
Assurance Co. vs. Scott, 17 F. (2) 4, which came before the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on appeal from the District
Court for the District of Colorado and necessitated the interpretation of the Colorado statute, since the policyholder had
shot and killed himself while insane, the court stated (p. 6),
"The question of whether the beneficiary in such a policy as
this would have been entitled to recover if the insured had
committed suicide while sane was not considered in any of
these (Colorado) cases, and the Supreme Court of Colorado
has thus far held only that suicide while insane is death by
accidental means, and covered by an accident policy providing
for death benefits." The court refused to go further than
this in interpreting the statute, but did state by way of dictum
that there was no reason why suicide while sane should be
covered by an accident policy, since suicide while sane is in no
sense of the word an accident.
The Missouri courts, in interpreting their statute, follow
the reasoning set forth in this dictum. It was held in Brunswick vs. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 278 Mo. 154, 213 S.
W. 45, that the statute did not apply where the insured committed suicide while sane. This court stated that such a death
was not an accident. The burden of proof was still on the
beneficiary to show an accidental death and if the proof
showed suicide while sane then the beneficiary had failed to
bear the burden. The defense of suicide need not be pleaded;
merely a denial of the accidental death, which the plaintiff
had still to pr9ve, sufficed.
The United States Supreme Court had previously interpreted this Missouri statute in a different manner in the Whitfield case, supra. However, the Brunswick case has since been
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followed by the old Eighth Circuit in the case of Von Crome
vs. Traveller's Ins. Co., 11 F. (2) 350, which held suicide
while sane to be a defense under the Missouri statute in the
above circumstance. The court rightfully based its decision
on the right of the state courts to determine the meaning and
applicability of its own state statutes and the binding effect
of such interpretation on the federal courts.
The Utah statute has been interpreted in exactly the opposite way and in the following manner. The Agee case,
supra, came before the old Eighth Circuit on appeal from the
District Court for the District of Utah. Here the insured
met his death by drowning. The insurance company attempted to rebut a prima facie case of accidental death by
introducing evidence of suicide while sane. The trial court
refused to admit this evidence. The Circuit Court approved
this ruling, stating that the defense would have been good in
the absence of the statute, but that it had been abolished by
the act. It also stated that any attempt on the part of the
insurance company to contract so as to limit its liability in
the instance of suicide was a nullity and the insurance company would be liable notwithstanding the suicide.
A writ of certiorari was granted by the United States
Supreme Court but was later revoked by it due to the receipt
by that court of a certified copy of the opinion of the Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Carter vs. Standard Ins.
Co., 65 Utah 465, 238 P. 259, 41 A. L. R. 1495, decided
while the Agee case was still before the United States Supreme
Court.
In the Cartercase, which came before the Utah courts, the
controversy was as to whether the insured's death, possibly
caused by an overdose of laudanum, was accidental or whether
he had deliberately and intentionally committed suicide. The
Utah Supreme Court upheld the beneficiary by a somewhat
peculiar holding to the effect that although suicide while sane
would be a good defense, nevertheless "after the plaintiff has
made a prima facie case of accidental death, to then permit the
defendant to prove the death was suicidal in order to rebut
the proof of accidental death would be to 'fly in the very
teeth of the statute,' and render it useless for the very purpose for which it was evidently intended." This interpreta-
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tion of the Utah statute by the Utah Supreme Court, being
in accord with the holding in the Circuit Court of Appeals
in the Agee case, the United States Supreme Court found it
unnecessary to review that decision and therefore revoked the
writ of certiorari as above mentioned.
The Agee case is remarkable, for while stating that the
Missouri and Utah statutes are the same in effect and that
the interpretation of the former is controlling on the court in
its interpretation of the latter, the court yet chose to disregard
the Missouri court's interpretation of its statute and followed
the old Whitheld case. The Agee case, as well as the Carter
case, goes a long way in interpreting the statute. It writes
the contract for the parties, making the company pay on a
policy covering death by accidental means, where the death
was not an accident under any construction of the word whatsoever.
There is certainly basis for the contention that the Utah
court, in the Carter case, erred in stating that to allow the
defense of suicide while sane in the instance of an accident
policy was to "fly in the very teeth of the statute." Not to
allow such a defense gives the insured a greater coverage than
either he or the insurance company contemplated. The insured wanted to be protected in case of accident, and the insurance company was willing to so protect him, but neither of
the parties considered or believed that death in any other way
than by accident was to be covered. Yet such is the result
brought about by the court virtually making itself a party
and rewriting the instrument for the original contracting
parties.
Very recently the Colorado statute has been interpreted
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Braukman case,
supra. In this case insured died of a gunshot wound alleged
by plaintiff beneficiary to have been accidentally inflicted.
The defendants' answers averred that death occurred through
suicide while insured was sane. Demurrers to these answers
were sustained and an appeal taken. The Circuit Court
affirmed the decision of Judge Symes in the District Court
for the District of Colorado, where the action was originally
brought.
The opinion, after reviewing and discussing, among
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others, the above cases, chose to follow the rule of the Agee
case and its interpretation of the Utah statute. It also stated
that in spite of the holding by the Missouri court in the
Brunswick case, supra, it believed the reasoning and logic in
the Whitfield case decided by the United States Supreme Court
to be more sound. It further stated that the insurance companies had two courses to follow-they could either "cease
writing policies in Colorado with a suicide exemption clause
or, if necessary, to amend premium schedules to cover the
additional risks."
This decision practically settles the question in Colorado,
for although it is not binding on the Colorado courts it will
undoubtedly be followed by them. The Colorado Supreme
Court has already shown a tendency to go a long way in
requiring the insurance companies to stay well within the
letter of the law, and making it practically mandatory that
the suicide clause either be left out of the policy altogether,
as suggested by the Circuit Court, or amended to fit the statute. For in the Daugherty case, supra, the Colorado Supreme
Court held that the clause was not only a nullity but also an
express and continuing denial of liability which waived the
requirements of giving notice of death and furnishing proof
of loss.
This decision, like those of the Carter and Agee cases,
overlooks the fact that such a clause is not a "denial of liability," but, rather, a limitation of liability and an excepted
risk not intended to be covered by the policy and as completely outside the scope of a personal accident policy as damage to the insured's property would be.
The result of these decisions is that the insurance companies are required by law to cover the risk of suicide although
to cover it expressly would render the policy void under the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Ritter
case, supra, which has never been overruled and which states
that "if a policy expressly provided for the payment of the
sum stipulated when or if the assured, in sound mind, took
his own life, the contract, even if not prohibited by statute,
would be held to be against public policy."
There would seem to be error in any case which allows
recovery on an accident policy where the policyholder inten-
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tionally and while in the full possession of his faculties takes
his own life: For it is certainly impossible for a beneficiary
under such circumstances to present a bona fide prima facie
case of accidental death since obviously there was no accident.
The remedies suggested by the Circuit Court in the
Brauhman case are both impractical and unjust. To force a
company to insure such a risk against its desire borders
closely on being an infringement of the constitutional right
to contract. Raising the premium rates would be inequitable
in that such action would force the policyholders who are
honest to bear the burden of paying for the policies of dishonest policyholders who, by their suicidal death, commit a
fraud not only upon the insurance company but also on the
other policyholders. The common sense and logical interpretation of the statutes, such as that adopted by the Missouri
courts, allows the imposition of fair premium rates and does
not impose an unjust burden on the majority of the policyholders.
HARRY S. SILVERSTEIN, JR., Class of 1936.

NOVEMBER DICTA NOTED
We were pleased recently to receive an inquiry from the
editor of an Eastern Bar Association magazine inquiring the
cost of reprinting 1,800 copies of the article in the November
Dicta by Mr. Frank Swancara entitled "Impolitic Reinstatement of Disbarred Lawyers," and we are now advised that
the printer has received an order for the article to be furnished
as an insert in the Massachusetts Law Quarterly.
We extend our congratulations to Mr. Swancara.

CONTRACTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF THIRD
PERSONS: WHEN THE RIGHT OF THE
BENEFICIARY BECOMES INDEFEASIBLE
N GENERAL, the law of Colorado regarding contracts
for the benefit of third parties follows the rules of the
majority of American courts.1 But in one important
instance the Colorado law is contrary to the weight of American authority. That instance concerns the question as to
when the right of the beneficiary becomes indefeasible so that
the parties to the contract cannot rescind it or alter its terms
without his consent.
In order to understand in just what way the Colorado
law is unusual it will be necessary to make a short analysis
of the difference between a donee or sole beneficiary and a
creditor beneficiary. First let us consider the former.
One is a donee or sole beneficiary if it appears from the
terms of the contract and surrounding circumstances that the
purpose of the promisee is to make him a gift or to confer
upon him the right against the promisor to some performance
not due from the promisee to the beneficiary.2 The chief
purpose of such a contract is to confer a benefit by way of a
gift. Now since the beneficiary has been given a right which
the courts have decided to enforce, it is clear that such right
should not be taken from him without his consent unless the
parties have reserved the power to do so. The only possible
question is as to when the right of the donee vests-is it at
the time the contract is made or not until he assents to it?
Since the gift is a benefit to him there seems no reason why
assent should not be presumed. Thus, on this basis, most
courts hold that the right of the donee becomes indefeasible
as soon as the contract is made.'
This argument, however, is not suited to the case of the
creditor beneficiary. A creditor beneficiary is one to whom
the promisee owes a duty which will be satisfied by performance by the promisor. In this type of case the promisee has
no intention to make a gift. He has made a bargain for the
'For an excellent summary of the Colorado law on the whole question, see Contractual Rights of Persons Not Parties to the Contract in Colorado, 3 Rocky Mountain Law Review 175 (1930).
'American Law Institute Restatement of Contracts, S'ec. 133.
"I Williston on Contracts 740, Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 142.
'Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 133.
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purpose of relieving himself from a liability, pecuniary or
otherwise, and it is himself and not the beneficiary whom he
intends to benefit. He has increased his own assets by arranging that his debt shall be paid by another. Thus the right
of the creditor beneficiary is not original as is that of the
donee beneficiary, but derivative; and when this debtor ceases
to have a right, his right, too, is cut off. He loses nothing by
an alteration or rescission of the contract.5 But since the
courts have given him a right to sue at law on the promise,
his right must become indefeasible at some time. This is generally held to be when he brings suit or materially changes
his position in reliance on the promise, or when the rescission
of the contract would be a fraud upon him as creditor of the
promisee.6
Thus we have seen that the right of the sole beneficiary
should, and in most jurisdictions does, vest at a much earlier
time than that of the creditor beneficiary, being based on different theoretical grounds. But, nevertheless, in Colorado
the two seem to be treated in precisely the same way.7
As far as the donee beneficiary is concerned the Colorado
cases conform to the weight of authority, uniformly holding
that unless the power to do so is reserved, the promisee cannot
alter or release the duty of the promisor to the beneficiary
without the consent of the latter. In Love vs. Clune, 24
Colorado 227, 50 Pac. 34 (1897), it was held that an
attempt to change the beneficiary of a life insurance policy
where the power to make such change was not reserved was
ineffectual to cut off the rights of the person first named as
beneficiary. This case concerns the policy of a fraternal benefit organization, the Locomotive Engineers Mutual Life and
Accident Association. In many jurisdictions the power to
change the beneficiary in a policy of a fraternal organization
exists without express words.8 But in Colorado even in such
a policy the reservation must be express, under this holding.
Pittinger vs. Pittinger, 28 Colo. 300, 64 Pac. 195 (1901),
is to the same effect.
'rThis is the analysis given in 1 Williston on Contracts 744.
'Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 143.
'See Rocky Mountain Law Review, cited supra, page 178.
'Restatement of Contract, Comment to Sec. 143.
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It should be further noted that in this state the reservation of a power to change the beneficiary does not of itself
divest the beneficiary of his interest, but that it becomes vested
at the moment the contract is formed, subject to a condition
subsequent. Hill vs. Capitol Life Insurance Co., 91 Colo.
551, 14 Pac. 2d 1006 (1932). Here the insured, not wishing to pay a note he had given as payment of the first premium, arranged for a cancellation of the policy. This was
done without the consent of the beneficiary. On the death
of the insured the beneficiary sued for the value of the policy
and was given judgment, the court holding that the interest
of the beneficiary was vested and could not be cut off without
her consent even though the reservation had been made. The
insured could have achieved the desired result simply by making his estate the beneficiary and then cancelling the policy.
On principle there would seem no reason for demanding this
roundabout route, but the case is in accord with earlier cases
holding that a power to change a beneficiary must be exercised in strict accordance with the terms of the reservation.
See Muller vs. Penn Mutual Life InsuranceCo., 62 Colo. 96,
Prof. W. R. Vance contends that
160 Pac. 188 (1916).
when the power to change the beneficiary is reserved the sound
view and the weight of authority are that the beneficiary has
no vested interest but only an expectancy. 31 Yale Law
Journal 343.
Colorado, then, enforces strictly the usual rule that a
donee beneficiary has a vested interest as soon as the contract
is made. Let us now see whether our law accords with the
weight of authority as regards a creditor beneficiary.
There are only two decided cases on this precise point.
These are in accord neither with the usual rule nor with each
other. In Starbird vs. Cranston, 24 Colo. 20, 48 Pac. 652
(1897), a grantee of lands promised to pay a mortgage which
the grantor had assumed. The grantor and grantee then
made arrangements rescinding the promise, but the mortgagee
was allowed to recover from the grantee. The court held
that the creditor beneficiary has an indefeasible right to performance as soon as the contract is made, and the promisor
and promisee have no power to discharge or vary the contract
without the consent of the beneficiary. The International
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Trust Co. vs. The Keefe Manufacturingand Investment Cc.,
40 Colo. 440, 91 Pac. 915 (1907), lays down a slightly different rule. Here a materialman sued the surety on a contractor's bond which had been given to the owner. The court
said, without distinguishing between a donee and a creditor
beneficiary, that the promisor and promisee could not vary
the terms of the bond after the beneficiary had "accepted" it.
It is not entirely clear what the court means by "accept," but
apparently the word is used as synonymous with "assent." If
this interpretation is correct then the case gives more power
to the promisor and promisee than the Starbird case, supra,
but less than the general rule. The rule as laid down here
was dictum, however, for the bond was conditional and the
condition had not been satisfied.
In conclusion, then, it may be said that Colorado, in common with many other jurisdictions, fails to distinguish between cases of donee and creditor beneficiaries. Theoretically, a distinction can and should be made, but perhaps it is
better that there be a single rule covering all types of cases, or,
if distinctions are to be drawn, that they be on practical and
equitable grounds rather than for theoretical reasons, as is
frequently done in giving insurance beneficiaries the greatest
GEORGE S. GRAHAM, Class of 1936.
possible rights.

FOR COLORADO: A CRIMINAL CODE?
We may think the law is the same if we refuse to
change the formulas. The identity is verbal only.
The formula no longer has the same correspondence with reality.-BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO in

A

Paradoxes of Legal Science.

S OLD as laws and lawyers is public dissatisfaction with

both-a dissatisfaction pervasive,

ubiquitous, and

without analogy in any other area of endeavor. Stage
and platform echo with the perennial theme of the law's delay
and the lawyer's vested interest in the evils of the status quo,
and the same theme fills many books and more editorials.
Criminal justice, in which the public as such is most obviously concerned, is the most commonly and fiercely assailed
object of all.
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One school of criticism holds that criminal procedure, by
cloaking the accused with the protection of violent presumptions and absurd safeguards, becomes the ally of the gangster-a sort of super-public enemy number one.
Another asserts criminal procedure to be the means and
the visible sign of class struggle and class inequality, of an
immense differential advantage in a game the services of whose
most skilled players are for sale to the highest bidder.
A third damns its rules with the cliche of "unscientific"
and asserts them to be the stale product of an art that has
marked time these many years while the sciences have gone
marching bravely on.
Last winter the writer, together with Mr. Joseph Hodges
of the district attorney's office, made for a committee of the
Denver Bar Association a comparison of the American Law
Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure with Colorado statutes and constitutional provisions on the same subject. The
method of the survey was to list the institute's code, section
by section, and to place opposite each section of the code the
Colorado provisions, if any, in point.
It is impossible in the scope of this paper to attempt even
a summary of so detailed a survey. It is possible, necessarily,
only to state conclusions of opinion for what they may be
worth. It is to be understood that the opinions expressed
herein are the writer's personal opinions and do not necessarily represent the views of Mr. Hodges, Mr. Stearns, or any
member of the committee.
How then, in the light of the commoner popular criticisms of criminal procedure outlined above, do the existing
Colorado laws compare with the American Law Institute
Code?
Those who would find in the code a panacea for "crime"
in the form of surrender to mass hysteria of the laboriously
acquired theory of our law that it is better some guilty persons escape punishment than the innocent be convicted, will
look in vain.
In some respects the code might be considered to protect
the rights of the accused less elaborately than the existing
Colorado statutes. The code, for one thing, eliminates the
necessity of a unanimous jury in cases less than capital,
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requiring a five-sixths concurrence of jurors in cases of felonies and a two-thirds concurrence in cases of misdemeanor,
the proportions being based upon a jury of twelve.
In general, however, the changes made by the code in this
respect reduce themselves to changes iii law to meet altered
conditions of life for the purpose of preserving, and not of
destroying, the balance struck by the common law between
the rights of the state and of the accused. That is to say, in
terms of the theory of Mr. Justice Cardozo, represented by
the quotations which preface this article, certain forms of
procedure appropriate to maintain a given balance in a stagecoach age are inappropriate to maintain the same balance in
an airplane age. The code preserves the balance that existing
laws once embodied and now, by their own inertia and the
momentum of change, threaten to destroy.
So far as the second and third criticisms of criminal procedure are concerned there is little to choose between the
existing Colorado provisions and the American Law Institute Code. While the adversary theory of justice remains
essentially the basis of both, each exhibits a trend away from
it in respect to such matters as the court's power to appoint
experts to examine the defendant when his mental condition
has become an issue. Both give the court such power, and
the 1927 Colorado law on the subject, though differing
somewhat in mechanics from the code, is no less enlightened
a piece of legislation, and either might be considered a partial
rebuttal of the criticisms that criminal procedure puts a premium upon wealth and is "unscientific."
But the respect in which the American Law Institute
Code points the way to the greatest improvement in Colorado criminal procedure is one not so often mentioned in
popular criticism.
The Colorado provisions regarding
criminal procedure are thoroughly haphazard. They show
the work of many skillful but uncoordinated hands. Here
their work is detailed, concrete; there, vague and general.
Often it contradicts itself and even more often it leaves one
wondering whether it does or not.
It is idle to debate the advantages and disadvantages of
codification versus the growth and development of the common law by the judicial process, for Colorado statutes of
criminal procedure have achieved a compromise embodying
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the disadvantages of both and the advantages of neither.
They are an incomplete code that is neither flesh, fowl, nor
good red herring. They form a crooked splint that emasculates the flexibility of the law without even the compensating
advantage of holding it straight and secure.
No glib and easy way to Utopia, the adoption of the
American Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure in
place of the existing statutes would not fully meet popular
criticism of criminal justice. It would, however, work a
great substantive improvement in bringing the law up to the
date of the society in which it exists, and achieve a desperately
needed transition in mechanics from confusion to clarity,
STANLEY L. DREXLER,
order, and practicability.
Class of 1936.

THE SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS IN COLORADO
HE common law on the survival of actions was best
expressed by the maxim "Actio personalis moritur cum
persona." By enactment of the territorial legislature,
January 10, 1868, that maxim, with the rest of the general
common law as of the fourth year of the reign of James I
(1607) became a part of the law of the territory which was
to be the State of Colorado. Another act of the same legislature, in the same year, set out the rule of survival of actions
which, with a slight modification, stands as law in Colorado
today. Under the schedule to the Constitution, both acts
became a part of the law of the State of Colorado. The statute declaring survival appears, as reenacted by Section 167
of the Session Laws of 1903, as Section 5383 of the Compiled Laws of 1921, reading: "All actions at law whatsoever, save and except actions on the case for slander or libel,
or trespass for injuries done to the person, and actions for the
recovery of real property, shall survive to and against executors, administrators, and conservators."
By the terms of this statute, the rule of the common law
is reversed. Instead of "Actio personalis moritur," we find
the law to be "All actions . . . shall survive," and only the
exceptions to the general statement of the Colorado statute
are in accord with the common law. Let us then proceed to
the interpretation of that statute.

DICTA

Probably the most fundamental point decided under that
statute is that it applies not only to "actions" in the technical
sense of an action already commenced, but to "causes of action," whether action has been brought or not. The contrary
apparently has never been suggested to the Colorado courts,
and the first case declaring the statute to apply to causes of
action, Kelley v. Union Pacific, 16 Colo. 455, laid down that
rule apparently without realizing that it was doing so. It is
said in that case (p. 458): "The act of 1868 was to prevent
certain causes of action already accrued from abating by reason of the death of either of the parties, without regard to the
cause of such death." The only intimation to the contrary is
contained in the case of Stratton'sIndependence v. Dines, 126
Fed. 968, where in the nature of a dictum it is said that the
statute applies only to "actions," and has no effect upon the
common law rule that a cause of action, upon which action
has not been brought, does not survive the death of either
party. In view of the statement contained in Kelley v. Union
Pacific, and the holdings in DeFord v. Ins. Co., 75 Colo.
146, Swartz v. Rosenkrans, 78 Colo. 167, and other cases,

it is clear that the Stratton case is in opposition to the proper
interpretation of the statute. It is clearly settled that the
terms of Section 5383 apply to causes of action, as well as
actions already commenced.
With the meaning of "actions" settled, we may proceed
to consider the meaning of the remainder of the statute. That
consideration will resolve itself into a consideration of the
exceptions contained in the statute, for the general declaration, "All actions shall survive," has been accepted at its face
value by the courts, and we shall consider the exceptions in
the order in which they occur.
"... except actions on the case for slander or libel." The
terms of the statute are so clear in this regard that neither of
the Colorado courts, the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals, nor the Federal court, has ever been called upon to
consider them. Without argument, it seems to have been
admitted that slander and libel do not survive.
"... except ...

trespass for injuries done to the person."

Under this second exception, there are two questions which
arise. First, what is the meaning of the word "trespass"?
And second, what is the meaning of the phrase, "injuries
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done to the person"? Kelley v. Union Pacific, supra, presented the first of these questions to the court. In that case,
the court realized that the meaning of the word "trespass"
might be confined to actions which at the common law would
have been actions of trespass, or it might have a broader
meaning, and cover the type of action that would have been
trespass on the case, as well as simple trespass. The court
discussed, but did not decide, this problem, but based its decision on the ground that the action there was one in contract,
and not within the exception in any case.
Munal v. Brown, 70 Fed. 967, presented this same
question to Judge Hallett, sitting in the United States District Court, in such manner that it could not be avoided. He
declared that, "Trespass for injuries done to the person"
included an action for trespass on the case as well as an action
for trespass, and dismissed an action based upon the negligence of a decedent, brought against his estate. The Colorado Court of Appeals cited and followed Judge Hallett's
ruling on that point in Letson v. Brown, 11 Colo. App. 11,
a case arising from the identical explosion.
The first question, as to the meaning of "trespass," may
be
regarded
as settled by these two cases. The meaning of
"trespass," for
this purpose, includes both trespass and trespass on the case, and both die with the death of either party.
Our second question, as to the meaning of "injuries done
to the person," is of greater difficulty, and has caused a great
deal more trouble than has the first. The starting point is
again Kelley v. Union Pacific, supra, containing dictum that
depletion of an estate is an injury to the estate, and not an
injury to the person within the contemplation of the statute.
To that extent the dictum has been adopted, as will appear
later, but the conclusion upon which the dictum was basedthat depletion of an estate caused by injuries to the body and
mind of its owner is properly to be considered an injury to
the estate-is clearly unsupportable, and has never been
accepted.
The first real light upon this subject came from Mumford
v. Wright, 12 Colo. App. 214, a case concerned with the
assignability of a cause of action for wrongful attachment of
property. After stating that survivability of the cause was
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the best test of its assignability, the court considered the
Colorado survival statute and its application to the facts presented. It is there said, at page 217, "Torts may be divided
into two classes, the first, designated as property torts, embracing all injuries and damages to property, real and personal; the second, known as personal torts, including all
injuries to the person, whether to reputation, feelings, or to
the body." And later, at page 218, "In our opinion, the
legislature had in view upon the adoption of that statute the
common law distinction then prevailing between personal
and property torts and desired to permit actions on the latter
to survive, . . . whilst the old rule should still prevail as to
actions based upon the former character of torts."
Swartz v. Rosenkrans, supra, an action of trover, accepts
the theory of Mumford v. Wright, that property torts survive while personal torts do not, and also the definitions of
Mumford v. Wright as to what are personal and what property torts. It is there declared, in holding that the action survives: "This action is also in tort, arising out of a violation
of the property rights of the deceased, causing a loss or damage thereto, by means of which his estate was depleted."
DeFord v. Ins. Co., supra, follows the theory of Mumford v.
Wright in holding that property torts survive while personal
torts do not, though its holding on what constitutes a property tort is not entirely clear.
These three cases, and those of Selkregg v. Thomas, 27
Colo. App. 259; Portland Co. v. Stratton's Independence,
196 Fed. 716, and others, make it clear that tort actions,
based upon trespass or trespass on the case, in which the injury or damage is to the property, survive the death of either
party, while those same actions, in which the injury or damage is done to the person, die with either party.
This distinction between personal and property torts
clarifies the issue to a great extent, but by no means completely, for it must still be determined what are personal
torts, and what are property torts. Under the broad definitive statements of Mumford v. Wright, which seem to have
been generally accepted, this is in most cases obvious, but
there are at least two sorts of cases in which there is doubt as
to which of the two classes the injuries come under.
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Mumford v. Wright and Swartz u. Rosenkrans are both
concerned, to a certain extent, with the matter of exemplary
damages. The general tenor of Mumford v. Wright, although
it is nowhere expressly so stated, is that the grant of such
damages must be based upon the violation of a purely personal right, and an action whose gist is the grant of such
damages must therefore be a personal tort, and does not survive. Swartz u. Rosenkrans, on the other hand, declares (p.
169), "There is no reason why we should not here follow
the principles applicable to such class of damages in other
similar suits," and allowed exemplary damages in the action
by an administrator upon a tort committed against the decedent.
The cases are readily distinguishable in fact, of course, in
that Swartz v. Rosenkrans is an action for conversion, while
Mumford u. Wright is a special statutory action for wrongful attachment, but the reasoning of the two cases is clearly
opposed. Swartz v. Rosenkrans, coming from the higher
court, and at a later date, must of course take precedence, but
there is much to be said for the attitude taken by the Court
of Appeals in Mumford v. Wright. The matter of exemplary damages received but cursory consideration in Swartz
v. Rosenkrans.
In all probability, the survival of the right to exemplary
damages is determined by the survival of the action in which
the damages are granted, but the matter cannot be regarded as
conclusively settled, and it is the opinion of the writer that
the Supreme Court would be willing to listen to arguments
to the contrary.
The second class of cases in which the application of the
rule and definitions of Mumford v. Wright is not quite clear
is what is sometimes called "The Newer Forms of Tort Liability," involving injuries to rights of a rather anomalous
character, in that they are not in the accepted sense injuries to
either the person or the person's property. Such cases involve
no injury to the reputation, feelings, or body, nor do they
involve injuries to the property such as would be provable as
damages in torts of a more classic character.
In two such cases the Colorado Supreme Court has been
called upon to apply the survival statute. The first was
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DeFord v. Ins. Co., supra, an action based upon the negligent
failure of an insurance company to act upon an application
for insurance. Upon demurrer to an action brought by the
beneficiary named in the application, the court held that the
action, if sustainable, must have been considered as an action
for failure to discharge a duty owed to the deceased, and was
not an action upon a contract, and sustained the demurrer.
Therefore, the action was one in tort, and damages, if any,
were to be provable as tort damages. In overruling a demurrer to action brought by the administrator, the court held
that the action was one for trespass, within the meaning of
the statute, but that the injuries were not injuries to the person, and the action survived to the administrator.
On the other hand, there is the case of Clapp v. Williams,
90 Colo. 13, an action brought for wrongful expulsion from
a labor union. The death of plaintiff pending appeal made
it necessary for the court to consider whether the action survived. It was there held that the action was one to recover
"for the loss of good will, an asset peculiar to the plaintiff."
The court held such injuries to be personal, and that the action did not survive.
The above cases are the only ones in which the court has
applied the survival statute to these newer developments of
the law of torts. In both cases th damages fall midway
between damages to the person and damages to the property,
as explained in the earlier cases. It cannot be said that the
cases are in conflict, for they are not necessarily so. The better conclusion is that the law on such matters has not developed to an extent sufficient to warrant any general conclusions as to the type of injuries which are caused, and that the
court must, by the pin-pricking process of judicial determination, establish a line of demarcation somewhere in the gap
which the classifications and definitions of the earlier cases
have left.

Such seems to be the determination of the second exception to the general law of Section 5383. The exception includes actions of trespass on the case, as well as trespass, and
speaking generally, includes only injuries done to the reputation, feelings, or body, and not injuries done to the property.
It is probable that the survival of the right to exemplary
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damages depends upon the survival of the action upon which
the right is based, but this is not certain, and there are excellent arguments to the contrary. As to the newer developments in the field of tort liability, no general statements may
be made. Each action will survive or die upon its own facts,
for there is scant authority on the matter.
The interpretation thus placed on this exception leaves
some interesting anomalies in the law. If A negligently
drives his car into that of B, causing injuries to B's person,
clothes, and car, and A dies in the collision, B can recover the
damages to his car and clothing from A's estate, but may
have no recovery for the injuries to his person. Or, if A's
car is driven by a chauffeur, C, who dies in the accident, A
surviving, B may not recover from the estate of C for his personal injuries, but may recover from A, whose liability was
not, so to speak, direct, but was based solely upon agency
principles. But, at the same time, B may proceed against
either A or the estate of C for the injuries to the car and
clothing.
Lastly, we consider the third exception, "...
except .
actions brought for the recovery of real estate." The action
covered by this exception seems to be contained in Chapter
23, and the latter part of Chapter 22, of Courtright's Mills
Annotated Code, 1933. A consideration of such provisions of the code as relate to the survival and abatement of
that action is of course necessary to a proper determination of
the meaning of the exception.
Section 15, Courtright's Mills Annotated Code, 1933,
provides that an action which survives shall not abate because
of the death of either party during suit. Section 306 declares
that the action for the recovery of real property shall not
abate by the death of any or all parties, but may be continued
against their heirs, representatives, or successors (or for such
parties). Under the survival statute and Section 15 of the
code, the action would abate; under Section 306 of the code,
it specifically does not abate. There is an apparent conflict,
but considering the survival statute to be substantive, and
the code provisions to be procedural, we may reach a fair
rationalization. Upon the death of either party during the
pendency of suit, the action dies, under the statute, but the
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interest of the deceased party passes to his heirs, representatives, or successors in interest at the moment of the death, and
since this interest comes by inheritance, it is exactly the same
as that of the deceased. Therefore, in order to avoid the
expense and delay, both to the litigants and the court, which
would be occasioned by the bringing of a new action on the
identical facts and rights, the procedural law, expressed by
the code, provides that the old suit may be continued.
Viewed technically, this is not a continuation of the prior
suit, but is the substitution of a new one, exactly on the
footing of the old. The terms of the survival statute are not
expressly overcome, although it must be admitted that the
effect of this procedure is to overcome them in substance.
Section 293, Courtright's Mills Annotated Code, 1933,
provides that the termination of the right of a plaintiff pending action shall not abate the action, but that he may have
a verdict for damages. Considered in the light of the conclusion above, and assuming that the death of a plaintiff is a
termination of his right within the meaning of the section,
the conclusion is that this action is of a dual character, part
for the recovery of the realty, part for damages for its detention. Section 293, allowing a recovery for damages only,
would so imply. This section, and those previously considered, seem to indicate, in a case of death of plaintiff with suit
pending, that his estate may recover damages for the withholding of possession, while the successor to his interest in
the property may recover the possession. Likewise, in case of
the death of a defendant, the person or persons entitled to
recover as above may recover against the estate for the withholding of possession, and against the successor to the deceased's interest may recover the possession itself.
These are admittedly the bare conclusions of the writer,
for neither Section 293 nor 306 has been considered in connection with the survival statute, so far as we are able to
ascertain. We hazard no opinion as to whether such reasoning would stand before the questioning eye of the court.
Such seems to be the meaning of Section 5383 of the
1921 laws---clear in most cases, uncertain and confused on a
few points, and completely open on others.
RICHARD P. BROWN,
Class of 1935.
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To MEMBERS OF THE DENVER BAR:

The Denver Bar Association is conducting a campaign
to take vigorous action to suppress the unlawful practice of
law in the City of Denver.
At the present moment in Denver many laymen are unlawfully preparing deeds, wills and legal papers of all kinds
and giving legal advice. Laymen are prosecuting actions and
appearing for corporations, individuals and agencies in the
justice courts and other courts. These and many other practices must be stopped.
The success of this campaign must depend to a very
large extent upon the interest and cooperation of each member of the Bar. It is to your interest to see that the practice
of law in Denver is carried on only by duly licensed and
authorized lawyers. The committee on unlawful practice of
the law is making every effort to ferret out the various unlawful practices. However, although it can do much in that
regard, it can do infinitely more if each member of the Bar
will immediately communicate to the committee any information he may obtain concerning the unauthorized practice
of law by any individual, agent, copartnership or corporation.
If any such practices are brought to your attention, will
you kindly communicate such information at once to the
undersigned?
Very truly yours,
MILTON D. GREEN,

Chairman, Committee on
Unauthorized Practice of Law.

!i ictaphun_
By B. C.

HILLIARD, JR.

A SEMI-MILITARY WEDDING
Steele, J. The following is a true account of an incident which
happened en camera.* It may (and will) help fill up a little space
in Dicta.
A man and woman appeared before me with a marriage license
and asked me to marry them. I consented. As they stood before me
I put the customary question, "Do either of you know of any reason
why you should not be joined in lawful wedlock?" Whereupon the
man said, "On the contrary, Judge, we should have been married quite
a while ago."
NEED A PARTNER, ARTHUR?
We discover from examination of Vol. XVII, No. 1, of that
exciting and interesting journal, School Review, official publication of
the Denver Public Schools, distributed widely and freely, that among
the "Officers but not members of the board," is S. Arthur Henry, Attorney, and that Arthur shares in that part of the school dollar labeled
2.81 cents.
A PARTNER SPEAKS HIS PIECE
"Dear Ben (that's us) : In doing some briefing the other day I
read the case of Duffy v. Gray, 52 Mo. 528, in which the opinion
states:
'The members of the firm (a partnership) could have no legal
interest whatever in the personal character of each other.'
"You have no partner, and, of course, cannot fully appreciate the
significance of this remark, except theoretically, but some day when you
are short on material, if ever (thanks), you might consider that this
statement might justify some comment of yours in 'Dictaphun,' not,
however, as coming from me."
Curious partners will learn his name on payment of fee to us.
*Which means in chambers, you dumb lugs.
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HOW THEY DO IT IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
From Andrews v. McNeill, Equity No. 52464, Supreme Court*
of the District of Columbia:
This agreement made the 6th day of June, 1913, between James
G. Kent and Amelia C. Boyton, both of Washington, D. C.
Believing that marriage is the highest and holiest relationship,
both agree to unite their fates in the holy bonds of matrimony.
For a consideration of $5,000, paid by the said Mrs. Boyton to
the said James G. Kent, he agrees to build her a neat and splendid residence, which she is to hold for life, whether her husband survives or
not.
The said James G. Kent also agrees to build another house with
the money of Mrs. Boyton, which she is to own in her name and is to
be hers and her heirs, viz.: her brother, Francis Andrews, his wife and
children. The half-sister, Sarah Jane Storer, is to have $2.00 according to will made in 1907.
The said James G. Kent agrees to be an honest, industrious, temperate, discreet and conscientious husband, and said Amelia C. Boyton
agrees to live all these characteristics and to never scold nor quarrel in
the presence of strangers.
Both will always be quiet and respectful to each other, but neither
will demand nor expect any undue affection.
Reason and righteousness shall be the motto of both and each will
strive to promote the health and happiness of the other, will shield
each other from tobacco smoke, and practice the Golden Rule, to do as
we wish to be done by.
JAMES G. KENT,
AMELIA C. BOYTON,

And a Merry Christmas to youse.
the New Year.

May you all get on relief in

*Which is the nisi prius court of the District, you dim wits.
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To THE DENVER
BAR ASSOCIATION

There's plenty of reason for our famous reputation as the
Donnelly
most popular entertainment center in townl
James and his scintillating music-food of an unvarying
delicious quality-a delightful atmosphere that is appreciated by discriminating tastes. You're always sure of a
successful evening-whether it's a twosome or a gay
party-when you come to

Get ready for
"A Night of
Nights"

THE BROADMOOR

New ikar
Eat
Nothing spared to
make this
the
greatest night in
our 10 years' history. Come to the
gayest pa rty in
town I Get in the
center of the celebration I Dance to
the grand rhythm
of
DONNELLY,
JAMES and HIS
ORCHESTRA

DON'T MISS THE GRAND TIME WE'VE PREPARED FOR YOU ON MONDAY NIGHT,
DECEMBER 24TH

10.hristia

Tu

till 8 a. m. Have
a banquet dinner!
Have a really unforgettable t i me
this New Year
Eve

Now!
The answer to what to do on Sunday Afternoon

SUNDAY MATINEE
DANCES
Very Popularl

B

Reservations for
New Year Eve
Necessary

U

3 to 6 P. M.

KEystone 6533

I

BROADMOO R
EDDIE OTT'S

ON GOLDEN ROAD

